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LAWYERS WHO DRAFT AND
NEGOTIATE GUARANTIES
(AND THE CLIENTS WHO LOVE THEM)*
TIMOTHY R. ZINNECKER**
Recent bestseller lists have often included legal thrillers, many of
which Hollywood has successfully converted into box-office block-
busters.! Wishing to respond to the public's apparently insatiable
desire to live vicariously in the riveting world of jurisprudence,
ABC-the Attorney Broadcasting Corporation-has recently offered
a channel devoted exclusively to law-related entertainment. One of
its most-watched programs is the award-winning, prime-time talk
show, "Obiter Dicta. 2 Let's drop in on today's episode being taped
to air during the crucial "sweeps week. "'
* With apologies to Geraldo, Phil, Jerry, Regis and Kathie Lee, Sally Jessy, Montel,
Maury, Ricki, Vicki, Jane, Jenny, and Oprah. Is it only me, or has anyone else noticed that
"Oprah" spelled backwards is "Harpo"? Could Oprah Winfrey and Harpo Marx actually be the
same person? Have you ever seen them together? Hmmmm. Sounds like an excellent topic for a
talk show. And another thing. Do you realize that "Evian" spelled backwards is "Naive"?
Subliminal marketing, perhaps? But I digress.
** Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. I conducted much of my
research while practicing in the banking department in the Houston office of Johnson & Gibbs,
P.C. I wish to thank that firm for the resources it made available to me. I also appreciate the
comments offered on earlier drafts of this article by James D. Gordon, III, Alan I. Inglis, Kenneth
A. Rogers, and Shelton M. Vaughn, although mentioning their names in no way implicates them
for including herein any erroneous legal conclusions, misstatements of law, extremist views, Blue-
book errors, or vain attempts at humor. I am only too happy to lay the blame for such flaws-if
any truly exist-on the one person most responsible for the way I am today: cartoonist Gary
Larson.
1. Although not a blockbuster, one of my favorite movies with a legal theme is Body Heat
(starring William Hurt, Kathleen Turner, and, in a bit role, Ted Danson, who wears a style of
glasses that I thought only my father owned). Any movie that can weave the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities into the plot is definitely worthy of citation. This footnote is dedicated to my property
professor, who first introduced the Rule Against Perpetuities to me and then proceeded to give me
one of my lowest grades in law school. I hope this footnote dedication eases the remorse and guilt
that no doubt continue to haunt her.
2. Latin for "Dick has an overbite."
3. Many lawyers would love to meet the proverbial "reasonable man." I, however, yearn
for the day when I come face to face with a member of a "Nielsen family" and finally obtain
answers to the following questions that have nagged me for years: Do you receive a free subscrip-
tion to TV Guide? Can you leave the room during commercials? And why didn't you watch The
Paper Chase more often in the 1970s and St. Elsewhere more often in the 1980s?
For a light-hearted look at the role the reasonable man has played in defining standards of
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EP: Hello everyone, and welcome to Obiter Dicta. I'm your host,
Elliott Pennoyer.4 Today I've invited two distinguished members of the
Texas Bar to join me for what promises to be a fascinating discussion of
how to draft and negotiate a guaranty. With me, from the Dallas boutique
firm5 of Six Incredibly Talented Lawyers, is Miranda Douglas, and from
the Houston firm of Gready, Grumpie, and Rood, is Howard Cronin. To-
gether they bring to the show more than thirty-five years of experience rep-
resenting corporations and financial institutions in a variety of commercial
transactions. Miranda, why don't you give us a hypothetical transaction for
purposes of today's discussion.
MD: All right. BigBank agrees to loan $100,000,000 to XYZ Com-
pany for general corporate purposes. Repayment will be secured by a lien
on the assets of XYZ Company and its subsidiaries. Additionally, XYZ's
parent-let's say ABC Inc.- will execute a stock pledge agreement and a
guaranty. All documents will be governed by Texas law.6
EP: So ABC will be our guarantor. Two questions, Howard. What
is a guaranty? And must it be in writing to be enforceable?
HC: I would define a guaranty as an undertaking by a party to an-
swer for the payment of some debt or the performance of some contract of
another party upon that party's default.7 In this case, ABC will undertake
to repay XYZ's debt to BigBank if XYZ fails to do so. ABC's guaranty
will not be enforceable unless it is in writing and signed by someone law-
fully authorized to sign on ABC's behalf, such as a corporate officer.8 The
conduct, see Randy T. Austin, Comment, Better Off with The Reasonable Man Dead or the Rea-
sonable Man Did the Darndest Things, 480 B.Y.U. L. REV. 479 (1992). It goes without saying-
but I'll say it anyway-that advocates of feminist legal theory view the term, "reasonable man,"
as an oxymoron.
4. My therapist believes that most of my abnormal behavior (including the use of such an
unusual surname for a television personality) can be traced to the mind-numbing trauma (not to
mention the temporary muteness and cranial meltdown) induced on my first day of law school
when my civil procedure professor began his lecture by glancing at the class roster and uttering
these chilling words: "Mindful of the scriptural admonition that the last shall be first ...."
5. A boutique firm is a collection of a few lawyers, each of whom is a member of the Order
of the Coiffure.
6. If I were to discuss the collateral in any detail, I of course would refer to the real estate
as Blackacre-again in an effort to prove to my property professor that I was paying attention in
class. See supra note 1.
7. See United States v. Vahlco Corp., 800 F.2d 462, 465 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Republic
Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Tex. 1978) ("A true guaranty creates a
secondary obligation whereby the guarantor promises to answer for the debt of another and may
be called upon to perform once the primary obligor has failed to perform.").
8. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(a), (b)(2) (Vernon 1987). For cases involv-
ing an oral guaranty, see Bass v. Fouts, 400 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1966, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (ruling that defendants who were not signatories to notes could not be held liable on
any alleged oral guaranties of the notes); Hein v. John Finnigan Co., 163 S.W. 124 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1914, no writ) (holding oral agreement by father to guaranty advances made
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moral of the story? An oral guaranty is not worth the paper it's written on.9
EP: (turning to the camera) Wow! A lawyer with a sense of humor.
Perhaps I can get him a spot on Ripley's Believe It Or Not or That's Incredi-
ble! (returning to his panelists) If we have a written guaranty, how will a
reviewing court resolve any disputes concerning its terms?
MD: A court's primary concern will be to ascertain the intent of the
parties.' ° However, because a guarantor is a so-called favorite of the law,"
the guaranty will be construed strictly in its favor.' 2 With this in mind,
lender's counsel-who usually prepares most of the loan papers-should
draft the guaranty with clarity and completeness and strive to avoid
ambiguity. 13
EP: Well, without further ado, let's examine a sample guaranty that
BigBank might ask ABC to execute. We asked Miranda and Howard to
provide a mutually agreeable first draft of a guaranty that BigBank's attor-
ney might submit to ABC and its counsel for review and comment. This
draft has been circulated to members of our studio audience and relevant
provisions will appear on the screens of our many television viewers. I'll
introduce the provisions and ask my guests to offer reasons for inclusion
to his son unenforceable). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 88(a) (1981) ("A
promise to be surety for the performance of a contractual obligation, made to the obligee, is
binding if (a) the promise is in writing and signed by the promisor ... .
For those readers of this article not familiar with Texas case citations, "n.r.e." is an abbrevia-
tion for "no reversible error," although many losing parties have alleged that it means "never
reviewed the evidence."
9. Egads! A dangling preposition!! As William Safire once said, "Is sloppiness in speech
caused by ignorance or apathy? I don't know and I don't care." ROBERT BYRNE, 1,911 BEST
THINGS ANYBODY EVER SAID 100 (1988).
10. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cramer, 6 F.3d 1102, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993); Coker v.
Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983).
11. Unlike the law, my parents refused to play favorites-even though I was an only child.
12. See United States v. Vahlco Corp., 800 F.2d 462, 465 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Cramer,
6 F.3d at 1102 (holding if guaranty contains an ambiguity, it should be construed in favor of the
guarantor); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Northpark Joint Venture, 958 F.2d 1313, 1320 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 963 (1993) (holding if the guaranty is ambiguous, court must apply
construction most favorable to guarantor); Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 394 n.l ("A guarantor is entitled
to have his agreement strictly construed so that it is limited to his undertakings, and it will not be
extended by construction or implication. Where uncertainty exists as to the meaning of a contract
of guaranty, its terms should be given a construction which is most favorable to the guarantor.")
(citations omitted); Tenneco Oil Co. v. Gulsby Eng'g, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 599, 605 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) ("A guaranty agreement is to be strictly construed and
shall not be extended beyond its precise terms by construction or implication."); Clark v. Walker-
Kurth Lumber Co., 689 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
("Where uncertainty exists as to the meaning of a contract of guaranty, and where two reasonable
constructions may be made, the reviewing court will apply the construction more favorable to the
guarantor.").
13. Lender's counsel should also strive to avoid being repetitious and redundant.
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and changes likely to be requested by ABC or its counsel. Miranda, why
don't you discuss the opening paragraph and the recitals.
GUARANTY
This Guaranty is executed as of _, 1994, by
ABC Inc. ("Guarantor") for the benefit of BigBank ("Lender").
Recitals
A. XYZ Company ("Borrower") and Lender have executed a
credit agreement as of the date of this Guaranty (as amended, supple-
mented, or restated, the "Credit Agreement"), together with certain
other Loan Papers.
B. Borrower is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Guarantor.
C. The execution and delivery of this Guaranty is a require-
ment to Lender's execution of the Credit Agreement and the other
Loan Papers and is an integral part of the transactions contemplated
by the Loan Papers and a condition precedent to Lender's obligations
to extend credit under the Credit Agreement.
MD: My only comment on the opening paragraph is that the execu-
tion date on the guaranty is not essential to its validity. 4 However, we'll
see in a moment its importance for other reasons.
Let's first examine the shortest recital, recital B. My personal prefer-
ence is to state the relationship that exists between the guarantor and the
borrower. This statement, however, is optional. In fact, the law does not
mandate that any relationship exist between the guarantor and the
borrower. 5
Recital C is included because it establishes prima facie evidence of
consideration. BigBank is agreeing to extend credit and other contractual
benefits to XYZ on the condition that ABC agrees to guaranty repayment of
the loan.
EP: But the extension of credit flows to XYZ, the borrower, rather
than ABC, the guarantor. Aren't you concerned about having the enforce-
ability of your guaranty challenged on grounds of failure of consideration?
MD: No. Numerous cases hold that consideration moving solely to
the borrower is sufficient to bind a guarantor. 6 However, a consideration
14. See Eastman Oil Well Survey Co. v. Hamil, 416 S.W.2d 597, 604 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. See 68 TEx. JUR. 3d Suretyship and Guaranty § 141 (1989) ("It is not necessary that a
contractual relationship exist between the principal obligor and the guarantor."). But try persuad-
ing a complete stranger to guaranty your house mortgage or car loan!
16. See, e.g., Cortez v. National Bank of Commerce, 578 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("A number of courts, including our Supreme Court,
has [sic] held that to support a contract of guaranteeship, it is not necessary that any consideration
pass directly to the guarantor. A consideration moving to the principal alone will suffice to bind
the guarantor where the note evidencing the primary obligation and the guaranty agreement are
executed contemporaneously. See Bonner Oil Co. v. Gaines, 108 Tex. 232, 191 S.W. 552
(1917) .. "); Barclay v. Waxahachie Bank & Trust Co., 568 S.W.2d 721, 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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problem may exist when the guaranty is executed after BigBank already has
advanced the loan proceeds to XYZ. In that situation, some new considera-
tion must exist to support the guaranty.' 7 If you're thinking that funds ad-
vanced under the credit agreement but after delivery of the guaranty suffice,
think again. t8 BigBank must incur a new detriment or provide an additional
benefit not previously contracted for.
EP: So, if possible, the guaranty should be executed contemporane-
ously with the credit agreement and the other loan papers, unless the loan
papers expressly make BigBank's agreement to advance funds contingent
upon its receipt of ABC's guaranty. I guess you include recital A in the
guaranty for evidentiary reasons relating to this issue.
MD: Precisely. It also provides me with two defined terms that are
used throughout the document: "Borrower" and "Credit Agreement."
EP: OK. Howard, why don't you introduce us to the first two sub-
stantive paragraphs of the guaranty and offer reasons why BigBank's coun-
Waco 1978, no writ) ("It is not necessary that consideration for the guaranty pass to the guarantor,
for it is sufficient consideration if the primary debtor receives some benefit."); Hargis v. Radio
Corp. of America, 539 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ) ("Consideration
for a guaranty agreement usually consists of either the sufferance of a detriment by the creditor or
a benefit conferred by the creditor on the primary debtor.").
Additionally, several commentators have concluded that consideration does flow to the par-
ent-guarantor because the capital stock of the subsidiary-borrower is an asset of the parent-guaran-
tor. Therefore, the credit extended by the lender inures indirectly to the benefit of the parent-
guarantor. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Carl, Fraudulent Transfer Attacks on Guaranties in Bankruptcy,
60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 115 (1986); David S. Walls, Promises to Keep: Intercorporate Guaran-
tees and Fraudulent Transfers in Bankruptcy, 19 UCC L.J. 219, 224-28 (1987); see also Waller v.
Missouri City State Bank, 482 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("In
this instance the Bank's implied promise to advance additional funds amounted to consideration
flowing not only to the principal debtor, but also, through it, to appellant as a stockholder-
guarantor.").
17. See Fourticq v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 679 S.W.2d 562, 564 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1984, no writ) ("If the promise of the guarantor is made contemporary to the promise of the
primary debtor, the consideration which supports the primary debtor's promise also supports that
of the guarantor. If, however, a contract of guaranty is entered into independently of the transac-
tion which created the primary debt or obligation, the guarantor's promise must be supported by
consideration distinct from that of the primary debt."); see also Sunbelt Say., FSB v. Barr, 824
S.W.2d 600, 602 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 837 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1992)
("[A] guaranty is often executed contemporaneously with the note that the guaranty collateral-
izes, and, when they are, the lender's willingness to make the loan evidenced by the note is itself
consideration for the guaranty."); cf. Maykus v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 550 S.W.2d 396, 398
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ) ("[M]ere evidence of a time discrepancy in execution
between a note [dated August 8, 1973] and a written guaranty agreement [dated August 15,
1973] is legally insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption of consideration which supports a
separate guaranty accord.").
18. See Fourticq, 679 S.W.2d at 565 ("We hold that for future indebtedness to constitute
consideration in a situation in which a guaranty is signed separately and subsequent to the incur-
ring of the primary indebtedness, the future indebtedness must be indebtedness not previously
contracted for by the parties.").
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sel includes them in the document. Miranda, please jump in with any
observations from the perspective of ABC's counsel. Later, I'll ask you to
switch roles. 9
Agreement
1. Guaranty. Guarantor guaranties to Lender the prompt pay-
ment at maturity (by acceleration or otherwise), and at all times there-
after, of the Guaranteed Debt (defined below), according to the
following paragraphs.
2. Definitions. Unless otherwise stated, terms defined in the
Credit Agreement have the same meanings when used in this Guar-
anty. The term "Borrower" includes its successors (by merger, con-
solidation, dissolution, or otherwise, including, without limitation,
Borrower as a debtor-in-possession and any party hereafter appointed
for Borrower or all or substantially all of its assets under any Debtor
Relief Law). The term "Guaranteed Debt" means the Obligation, to-
gether with (a) amounts that would be part of the Obligation but for
operation of any applicable provision of Title 11 ("Bankruptcy") of
the United States Code, (b) all pre- and postmaturity interest thereon
(including, without limitation, all postpetition interest provided for
under the Loan Papers if Borrower voluntarily or involuntarily files
for bankruptcy protection and regardless whether Lender is entitled to
recover that interest from Borrower), and (c) any and all costs, attor-
neys' fees, and expenses reasonably incurred by Lender to enforce
Borrower's, Guarantor's, or any other obligor's payment of any of
the foregoing indebtedness.
HC: The first paragraph provides the operative language, "Guarantor
guaranties," which BigBank wants to see somewhere in the guaranty. The
paragraph also indicates that ABC's payment obligations are not limited to
any particular date. Rather, its payment obligations may come due before
any scheduled maturity date-for example, if BigBank accelerates payment
following a default by XYZ-and will continue thereafter until satisfied.
The first sentence of the second paragraph is standard in many guar-
anty documents and permits the parties to use terms defined in the credit
agreement-many of which may be rather lengthy-without restating them
verbatim in the guaranty. For example, this guaranty uses the terms
"Debtor Relief Law," "Default," "Loan Papers," and "Obligation," each of
19. Many lawyers might refer to this as a switching of hats. For example, counsel for a
lender might say to his client, "Well, if I were wearing my borrower's hat, I'd have the following
comments on this nefarious, draconian, and overreaching document." The reference is anachro-
nistic, however, as few, if any, lawyers or clients actually wear hats today. Perhaps another article
of clothing should be referenced. Many come to mind, but none has only one syllable of three
letters. Bqcause many lawyers allegedly (a word that saves me from a defamation action) charge
by the letter or syllable-rather than the rumored 20-second blocks rounded upward to the nearest
hour-perhaps clients are best served by no change.
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which will be defined in the credit agreement between BigBank and XYZ.2°
The second sentence expands the definition of Borrower. Normally,
the credit agreement prohibits XYZ from merging or consolidating with
another entity or filing articles of dissolution. Thus, its contrary action, as
well as its bankruptcy, will trigger a default-which permits BigBank to
seek payment from ABC under paragraph 4 of the guaranty. ABC may
concede that a default exists, but argue that it is not liable under the guar-
anty because it only guaranteed payment of debts owed by XYZ-which
may not technically or legally exist after its bankruptcy, corporate restruc-
ture, or dissolution. The expanded definition of Borrower should rebut
ABC's argument.2"
In my opinion, the final sentence of the second paragraph may be the
20. Typically some variation of the following definitions will be found in the credit
agreement:
"Debtor Relief Laws" means the Bankruptcy Code of the United States of America
and all other applicable federal or state liquidation, conservatorship, bankruptcy, mora-
torium, rearrangement, receivership, insolvency, reorganization, suspension of pay-
ments, or similar laws affecting creditors' rights.
"Loan Papers" means (a) this credit agreement, certificates and reports delivered
under this credit agreement, and exhibits and schedules to this credit agreement, (b) all
agreements, documents, and instruments in favor of Lender ever delivered under this
credit agreement or in connection with all or any part of the Obligation, and (c) all
renewals, extensions, and restatements of, and amendments and supplements to, any of
the foregoing.
"Obligation" means all present and future indebtedness and obligations, and all
renewals, increases, and extensions thereof, or any part thereof, now or hereafter owed
to Lender by Borrower or any related entity under any Loan Paper, together with all
interest accruing thereon, fees, costs, and expenses (including, without limitation, all
attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in the enforcement or collection thereof) payable
under the Loan Papers or in connection with the protection of rights and remedies under
the Loan Papers.
Often, the definition of "Default" refers the reader to a particular section in the credit agree-
ment for provisions that describe events deemed a default. Such events usually include failing or
refusing to make a loan payment when due, breaking a covenant, making a misrepresentation,
defaulting under a material contract, being the subject of a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy
proceeding, or wearing a green leisure suit in public.
21. See, e.g., Chambers v. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, 841 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (ruling that guarantor remained liable for debt incurred by
partnership after incorporation because guaranty stated change in status of debtor by "merger,
consolidation or otherwise" would not alter guarantor's liability).
Unless an existing guaranty expressly states that the guarantor's liability extends to postpeti-
tion financing, the postpetition lender should require the guarantor to execute a new guaranty as a
prerequisite to funding any postpetition loan. Otherwise, the guarantor may not be liable for the
postpetition loans. See Bank of New England, N.A. v. Klein, 86 B.R. 897 (S.D. Tex. 1988)
(holding that in absence of any contrary language in guaranty, guarantor was not liable for postpe-
tition financing to borrower because debtor-in-possession was entity distinct from borrower).
Postpetition financing is referred to as DIP lending ("DIP" being an acronym for "debtor-in-
possession"). Hindsight usually reveals whether the postpetition lender or the debtor-in-posses-
sion is the bigger DIP.
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most important sentence in the entire guaranty because it describes what
ABC is obligated to pay. This definition of Guaranteed Debt includes the
Obligation, all interest (whether accruing before or after maturity), and all
attorneys' fees and other costs incurred by BigBank in enforcing payment
of any of the guaranteed debt. Although interest is included within the defi-
nition of Obligation, it seems prudent to emphasize to ABC that its liability
is greater than just the principal amount of the $100,000,000 loan. Attor-
neys' fees are specifically mentioned; otherwise, guarantors are not liable
for them under Texas law.22
The parenthetical provision pertaining to XYZ's possible bankruptcy
is included because section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code prevents
BigBank from recovering postpetition interest from XYZ unless the value
of collateral equals or exceeds the unpaid obligation. 3 If BigBank is un-
dersecured, ABC might argue that it is not liable under the guaranty for
postpetition interest because XYZ is not liable for postpetition interest.2 4
Also, after a bankruptcy petition is filed, the automatic stay provision of the
Bankruptcy Code2" may bar BigBank from collecting any payments from
XYZ until BigBank obtains relief from the stay. ABC might argue that it is
not liable under its guaranty for any payments that XYZ cannot make itself
while the stay is in effect. The definition of Guaranteed Debt, as well as
language in paragraph 8(e) below, that clearly states that ABC's liability
under the guaranty is not released, diminished, or impaired if XYZ seeks
bankruptcy protection, should successfully rebut ABC's contrary
arguments.2 6
EP: The definition of Guaranteed Debt seems transaction-specific; it
includes the Obligation and related interest and expenses. Don't many
drafters define Guaranteed Debt in a more open-ended manner? For exam-
ple, I've seen definitions that purportedly covered all debt of every kind and
character owed by a borrower to a lender, whether then existing or thereaf-
ter arising, including, without limitation, the "Obligation," as that term is
22. See Blume v. National Homes Corp., 441 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tex. 1969) ("It is well
settled that signers of Guaranty Agreements are not liable for attorney's fees incurred in suits to
enforce such guaranty agreements in the absence of an express provision for such liability.").
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
24. See, e.g., Western Bank-Downtown v. Carline, 757 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. App.-Houston
[I st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (holding guarantor not liable for postpetition interest where lender's
claim was undersecured-thus precluding payment of postpetition interest by borrower-and
guaranty covered only debt that borrower owed to lender).
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
26. See United States v. Bruno, 747 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding guarantor liable for
postpetition interest not otherwise payable by borrower where guaranty stated guarantor's liability
would not be affected or impaired by borrower's bankruptcy or release by law) (cited with ap-
proval in Western Bank, 757 S.W.2d at 114).
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defined in a specific agreement, together with interest, attorneys' fees, etc.
Wouldn't BigBank prefer the expanded definition?
HC: Probably. Under an expanded definition, ABC is liable not only
for all of the debt that falls within paragraph 2's definition of Guaranteed
Debt, but also for all other debt that XYZ may then or thereafter owe to
BigBank under agreements separate from the credit agreement, such as let-
ters of credit, interest rate contracts, and other loan agreements. Counsel
for lenders often adopt the expanded definition of Guaranteed Debt that you
have suggested, but I am sympathetic to the response that a guarantor and
its counsel will make to that definition.
EP: And Miranda, what would that response be?
MD: A broad definition exposes a guarantor to unlimited liability be-
cause it cannot be determined with any degree of comfort what additional
debt the borrower may incur and owe to the lender. Under a transaction-
specific definition, ABC can estimate its potential exposure at
$100,000,000 plus related interest and costs. However, under an open-
ended definition, XYZ and BigBank-over ABC's objections-may ex-
pand their relationship, the effect of which will increase-perhaps double
or triple-ABC's potential liability under its guaranty. I never recommend
to my clients that they sign a guaranty that exposes them to such unlimited
exposure. Instead, I request a deal-specific definition of Guaranteed Debt
such as the one presented above. If the lender and its counsel object to a
definition that narrows the scope of exposure, then I insist that the docu-
ment permit the guarantor to give written notice to the lender that it will not
be liable under the guaranty for any debt incurred by the borrower after
such notice is given.
HC: And as lender's counsel I'll respond by requesting language that
clearly indicates that the guarantor remains liable under its guaranty for the
guaranteed debt as it exists when the notice is given, plus all loans made
after notice is given if made under commitments or agreements executed by
the borrower and the lender prior to the notice. I'll also recommend lan-
guage indicating that the guarantor remains liable for renewals and exten-
sions of the debt outstanding as of the date of its notice, as well as renewals
and extensions of additional debt incurred by the borrower after such no-
tice, but pursuant to commitments and agreements made by the borrower
and the lender prior to such notice.27
27. See First Bank v. Bradley, 702 S.W.2d 683, 685-86 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1985, no writ) ("Following such a revocation, the guarantor is liable only for extensions of credit
before the revocation and any renewals or extensions of the indebtedness he initially guaran-
teed."); Dicker v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 576 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("[A] written revocation would be effective only as to loans made
subsequent to such notice and not to a renewal of an existing loan.").
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MD: At which point I'll suggest language clearly prohibiting liability
for any increases upon renewal and extension.
EP: So let's assume that a guaranty includes an open-ended defini-
tion of Guaranteed Debt, but also includes the language suggested by each
of you. Let's also assume that ABC gives notice of revocation when
BigBank has advanced $150,000,000 under two $100,000,000 credit facili-
ties; one facility is fully funded and the other permits XYZ to borrow the
remaining $50,000,000. Under a guaranty with your suggested language,
ABC remains liable for the outstanding loans of $150,000,000 plus any of
the additional $50,000,000 funded thereafter. ABC's liability remains un-
changed if at an assumed maturity date of December 31, 1994, XYZ and
BigBank extend the maturity for an additional year, as long as they do not
increase the original principal of $200,000,000. Correct?
HC and MD (simultaneously): Correct. 8
EP: Then let's move on. Howard, please give us your thoughts on
paragraph 3.
3. Absolute, Irrevocable, and Continuing Guaranty. This in-
strument is an absolute, irrevocable, and continuing guaranty, and the
circumstance that at any time or from time to time the Guaranteed
Debt may be paid in full does not affect the obligation of Guarantor
with respect to the Guaranteed Debt of Borrower thereafter incurred.
Notwithstanding any contrary provision in this Guaranty, however,
Guarantor's maximum liability hereunder is limited, to the extent, if
any, required so that its liability is not subject to avoidance under any
Debtor Relief Law.
HC: The first sentence specifically mentions irrevocability because
Texas law permits a guarantor to revoke the guaranty unless that right is
precluded by language in the guaranty.29 The first sentence also indicates
that the guaranty remains effective even if the guaranteed debt occasionally
has a zero balance.
EP: When would that happen?
HC: Assume that the $100,000,000 loan is in the form of a revolving
facility that permits XYZ to borrow, repay, and reborrow funds prior to the
A prudent lender should condition the funding of any postrevocation renewals and extensions
on the guarantor's express guaranty thereof, and not rely solely on language in the guaranty.
28. Because Howard and Miranda are on national television, they dare not utter what they
are both thinking: "Jinx one two three you owe me a Coke."
29. See Straus-Frank Co., v. Hughes, 156 S.W.2d 519, 520 (Tex. 1941) ("The general rule is
that a continuing guaranty may be revoked by the guarantor unless the right to revoke is precluded
by the language of the guaranty contract."); First Bank, 702 S.W.2d at 685 ("[A] guarantor may
revoke his guaranty at any time unless that right is precluded by the language of the guaranty
contract.").
The drafting party should qualify or delete any reference to irrevocability if the lender agrees
that the guarantor may give notice of revocation.
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maturity date. XYZ might request an initial advance of $10,000,000 on
January 1, repay it on January 31, and request a second advance of
$10,000,000 on March 1. The sentence removes any doubt that ABC is
somehow released from liability for the second funding because the guaran-
teed debt had an interim zero balance during February.
EP: I see. And the second sentence?
HC: The second sentence is included in an effort to minimize the
fraudulent transfer hazards under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act3° and section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code,3 1 under which a court or
bankruptcy trustee may set aside the guaranty if evidence indicates that
ABC satisfies one of the articulated financial distress tests and did not re-
ceive reasonably equivalent value for its payment obligations under the
guaranty. 32 Even without the language, BigBank's risk that ABC's guar-
anty obligation is a fraudulent transfer is diminished because ABC is the
parent of XYZ, the borrower. As we mentioned earlier,33 BigBank may
successfully argue that ABC received reasonably equivalent value for its
payment obligations under the guaranty because all loans made to XYZ
30. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.001-24.013 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.005(a)(2),
24.006(a) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994). A court or bankruptcy trustee also could set aside the
guaranty if evidence indicated that the guarantor executed the guaranty with actual intent to hin-
der, delay, or defraud any of its creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 24.005(a)(1) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994). The bankruptcy trustee may attack the
guaranty as a fraudulent transfer under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act through its
avoidance powers under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988).
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code applies only if the guarantor is bankrupt and the guar-
anty was executed within one year preceding the date on which the guarantor's bankruptcy peti-
tion was filed. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988). In contrast, the Texas statute requires the guarantor's
claim to arise before or within a reasonable time after the guaranty was executed. TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994). See also id. § 24.010 (indicating that
a cause of action for a fraudulent transfer is extinguished unless action is brought within a pre-
scribed time period).
Numerous articles discuss fraudulent transfer challenges to guaranty documents. See, e.g.,
Phillip I. Blumberg, Intragroup (Upstream, Cross-Stream and Downstream) Guarantees Under
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 685 (1987); Kenneth J. Carl, Fraudu-
lent Transfer Attacks on Guaranties in Bankruptcy, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 115 (1986); George
A. Nation III, Some Thoughts About Intercorporate Guaranties, Fair Consideration, and Reason-
ably Equivalent Value, 37 DRAKE L. REV. 569 (1987-88); Robert J. Rosenberg, Intercorporate
Guaranties and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender Beware, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 235
(1976); David S. Walls, Promises to Keep: Intercorporate Guarantees and Fraudulent Transfers
in Bankruptcy, 19 UCC L.J. 219, 224-28 (1987); Scott F. Norberg, Comment, Avoidability of
Intercorporate Guarantees Under Sections 548(a)(2) and 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 64 N.C.
L. REV. 1099 (1986); Robert K. Rasmussen, Comment, Guarantees and Section 548(a)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1985).
33. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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indirectly inured to the benefit of ABC through its ownership of XYZ.34
EP: Howard, couldn't you minimize the fraudulent transfer hazards
by limiting ABC's liability to a high percentage-for example, ninety-five
percent-of its net worth? ABC would retain a sliver of net worth, and
therefore its payment obligations under the guaranty would not render it
insolvent.
HC: Many attorneys agree with you and draft accordingly. How-
ever, a net worth guaranty raises various concerns, at least in my mind. For
example, the net worth guaranty may address insolvency problems 35 but
still be voidable as a fraudulent transfer if the guarantor fails the capitaliza-
tion or cash flow tests.36 Also, "net worth" is an elusive concept. How do
you define it-and as of what day? Furthermore, a net worth guaranty, by
definition, requires the lender to leave value on the table for the guarantor's
other creditors. No lender likes to do that. Finally, the theoretically en-
hanced enforceability of a net worth guaranty against fraudulent convey-
ance attack has not been judicially scrutinized. Who can guess what
percentage of net worth articulated in a guaranty will eventually pass judi-
cial muster? Eighty-five percent? Ninety-nine percent? 37 For these rea-
sons, I avoid using a net worth limitation in any guaranty that I draft for a
lender.
EP: OK, let's move on. Miranda, walk us through the fourth
paragraph.
4. Payment on Default. If a Default exists, Guarantor shall, on
demand and without further notice of dishonor and without any no-
tice having been given to Guarantor previous to such demand of
either the acceptance by Lender of this Guaranty or the creation or
incurrence of any Guaranteed Debt, pay the amount of the Guaran-
teed Debt then due and payable to Lender, and it is not necessary for
34. However, the same argument cannot be made if the guarantor is a subsidiary, rather than
the parent, of the borrower. In this so-called upstream context, the only value likely to be received
by the subsidiary guarantor may be limited to the amount of funds that are borrowed by the parent
borrower and downstreamed to the subsidiary guarantor. In an effort to reduce fraudulent transfer
exposure, some subsidiary guaranties expressly limit the guarantor's liability to the borrowed
funds that it indirectly receives, together with related interest and costs. The lender that holds
such a guaranty must carefully document which corporate entity ultimately receives each loan
disbursement, and should require that entity to repay any such loan directly to the lender, rather
than direct payments through the borrower-whose failure to forward the loan payments to the
lender may trigger a dispute as to the amount of the guarantor's liability.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i) (1988); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.006(a) (Vernon
1987 & Supp. 1994).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii), (iii) (1988); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a)(2)
(A), (B) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994).
37. All of these concerns are discussed in the article by Brad R. Godshall & Robert A.
Klyman, Wading "Upstream" in Leveraged Transactions: Traditional Guarantees v. "Net
Worth" Guarantees, 46 Bus. LAW. 391, 397-400 (1991).
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Lender, in order to enforce such payment by Guarantor, first or con-
temporaneously to institute suit or exhaust remedies against Borrower
or others liable on such indebtedness or to enforce rights against any
collateral securing such indebtedness.
MD: This paragraph requires ABC to pay the guaranteed debt then
due and payable upon BigBank's demand-which BigBank cannot make
unless a default exists. If the credit agreement permits BigBank to acceler-
ate the maturity of the loan if a default exists, and BigBank has done so,
then the guaranteed debt "then due and payable" will be the entire loan,
regardless of whether the default is a payment default or a non-payment
default, and whether any of the loan was otherwise due and payable when
the default occurred. Also, the language at the end of the paragraph pre-
vents ABC from successfully arguing that BigBank cannot demand pay-
ment under the guaranty until BigBank first sues XYZ38 or forecloses on
the collateral pledged by any party.39
EP: So in a lawsuit to recover on the guaranty, BigBank must prove
that a default exists and it has demanded payment from ABC.4" Anything
else?
MD: BigBank also must establish that it is the present holder of
XYZ's note, the beneficiary of a guaranty executed by ABC, and the
amount demanded is due and payable.4 Because the effectiveness of the
guaranty is not expressly subject to any other conditions precedent,
BigBank need not prove anything else.42
38. See Hanks v. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, 815 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991, no
writ) (holding that language in guaranty permitted lender to enforce payment by guarantor before
suing other liable parties, including maker of notes).
39. See SEI Business Sys., Inc. v. Bank One Texas, N.A., 803 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) (concluding that language in guaranty relieved lender from any duty
to sell collateral before suing guarantor).
40. For a case in which the court held that a lawsuit against the guarantors was itself suffi-
cient demand-over the objections of the guarantors in reliance on specific language in the guar-
anty requiring written demand as a condition to payment-see Texas Water Supply Corp. v.
Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 204 F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1953).
41. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Marshall, 939 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[To recover
from guarantor of note], the RTC had to establish (1) that the note and the guaranty agreement
exist and are valid, (2) that the RTC is the present holder or owner of the note, (3) that [the
maker] defaulted on the note, and (4) that [the guarantor] is liable under the guaranty agree-
ment."); Sunbelt Sav., FSB v. Birch, 796 F. Supp. 991, 995 (N.D. Tex. 1992) ("Under Texas law,
a plaintiff may recover upon a guaranty if he shows (1) that the defendant executed the guaranty,
(2) that the underlying note is in default, (3) that the plaintiff is the present holder of the note and
guaranty, and (4) that a certain balance is due and owing.").
BigBank's cause of action against ABC is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See
FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805, 807 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.004(a)(3) (Vernon 1986)).
42. See, e.g., Eastman Oil Well Survey Co. v. Hamil, 416 S.W.2d 597, 604-05 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that guarantor could not avoid liability on
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EP: Howard, will ABC's counsel offer any comments on paragraph
4?
HC: Perhaps one. If the guarantor and the borrower are part of the
same corporate family-such as ABC and XYZ-ABC's lawyer may re-
quest language that (1) requires the lender to notify the guarantor of the
default before exercising its rights and remedies, and (2) permits the guar-
antor to avoid paying the guaranteed debt then due and payable if it cures
the default during a short period-for example, five days-after receiving
the notice. The lender should not mind waiting a few days before exercis-
ing its rights and remedies if during that time the guarantor can remedy the
default through either its relationship with the borrower or its own in-
dependent actions.
MD: I, too, make a similar request when I represent a guarantor. If
I'm representing the lender, I raise the proposed change with my client but
don't offer a lot of input, as this is more of a business issue than a legal
issue.43 Some banks don't mind giving a default notice and a short cure
period to the guarantor, but others adamantly refuse to do so because such a
change either violates bank policy, or runs counter to prevailing market
terms. 4 If I represent the lender and the guarantor's request for notice and
cure is acceptable to my client, I'll draft language that indicates that the
lender is not obligated to give notice-and no cure period exists-if the
relevant default is bankruptcy related or otherwise based on a factual situa-
tion that cannot be cured by the guarantor, such as a misrepresentation or an
unauthorized disposition of collateral.45
grounds of (i) conditional delivery when beneficiary had no knowledge of conditions or (ii) failure
to receive notice of acceptance when guaranty was not in form of offer or proposal, and neither
guarantor's conduct nor guaranty itself suggested guarantor expected or desired notice of
acceptance).
43. The "business issue" theory is most often invoked by an attorney to deflect to the client
the hate-filled stares, crass gestures, and unkind thoughts of opposing counsel and its client. "I
sympathize with you, I really do, and I'm pdrsuaded by your well-reasoned arguments that you
have articulated extremely well. But, my client told me to draft the provision this way and, well,
it really is a business issue." In some circles, the business issue theory is called "passing the
buck" or "doing the Pontius Pilate."
44. The "violates bank policy" and "runs counter to prevailing market terms" arguments are
not-so-distant cousins of the business issue theory.
45. As revised, paragraph 4 might read as follows:
Lender shall notify Guarantor in writing of any Default (other than any bankruptcy-
related Default or Default under Sections - of the Credit Agreement) prior to exer-
cising any remedies under the Loan Papers and Guarantor shall have the right to cure
any such Default within five days after receiving any such notice. If, while a Default
exists, Borrower fails to pay the entire unpaid balance of the Obligation then due and
payable and Guarantor fails to cure such Default within five days after receiving notice
of such Default from Lender (other than any bankruptcy-related Default or Default
under Sections - of the Credit Agreement, to which no such notice and cure period
apply), then Guarantor shall, on demand and without further notice of dishonor and
[Vol. 35:387.
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EP: Howard, tell us about paragraph 5.
5. Waiver of Subrogation Rights, Etc. Guarantor will not as-
sert, enforce, or otherwise exercise (a) any right of subrogation to any
of the rights or liens of Lender or any other beneficiary against Bor-
rower or any other obligor on the Guaranteed Debt or any collateral
or other security, or (b) any right of recourse, reimbursement, subro-
gation, contribution, indemnification, or similar right against Bor-
rower or any other obligor on all or any part of the Guaranteed Debt,
and Guarantor irrevocably waives any and all of the foregoing rights
(whether such rights arise in equity, under contract, by statute, under
common law, or otherwise).
HC: This provision attempts to respond to the mischief created by
the infamous Deprizio decision,4 6 which effectively held that a bankruptcy
trustee could recover from a lender any payment made by the borrower to
the lender within one year of the filing date of the borrower's bankruptcy
petition if the payment was guaranteed by an insider of the borrower. The
court's analysis went something like this: Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code permits a bankruptcy trustee to recover payments made by the bank-
rupt borrower (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor, (2) for a debt incurred
before the payment was made, (3) made while the borrower was insol-
vent,47 (4) made on or within ninety days before the date of the filing of the
petition or between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider, and
(5) that enable the creditor to receive more than the creditor would receive
if the case were a chapter seven liquidation case and payments were not
made.48 A guarantor is a "creditor" of the bankrupt borrower because its
common law subrogation fights to payment from the borrower that are cre-
ated when the guarantor makes payment to the lender under its guaranty
give it a "claim" recognized by the Bankruptcy Code.4 9 Each of the bor-
rower's payments of the debt owed to the lender is "for the benefit of" the
guarantor because every reduction in the debt reduces the guarantor's expo-
without any notice having been given to Guarantor previous to such demand of either
the acceptance by Lender of this Guaranty or the creation or incurrence of any Guaran-
teed Debt, pay the amount of the Guaranteed Debt then due and payable to Lender, and
it is not necessary for Lender, in order to enforce such payment by Guarantor, first or.
contemporaneously to institute suit or exhaust remedies against Borrower or others lia-
ble on such indebtedness or to enforce rights against any collateral securing such
indebtedness.
46. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.M. Deprizio Constr.), 874 F.2d 1186,
1200-01 (7th Cir. 1989).
47. A debtor is presumed to be insolvent during the 90-day period preceding the filing date
of the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (1988).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
49. Id. ,§ 101(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1992) (definition of "claim" includes contingent rights to pay-
ment) and § 101(10) (definition of "creditor" includes party with claim).
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sure under its guaranty." If the guarantor-creditor is an "insider"-which
the Bankruptcy Code defines as including a person in control of the bor-
rower, such as its parent corporation" -the preference period is extended
fourfold from ninety days to one year.5 2 And, section 550 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code permits the trustee to recover from the lender-as the "initial
transferee"-all of the borrower's payments that benefitted the insider
guarantor.53
EP: So an innocent noninsider lender who prudently attempts to miti-
gate its potential loss by requiring a guaranty-which almost always will be
executed by an insider-risks quadrupling the preference period during
which loan payments received by the lender may later be disgorged upon
attack by the trustee?
HC: Yes. The decision has not been favorably received in the finan-
cial community and has been the subject of much commentary.54 And, un-
fortunately, the Deprizio analysis has been adopted by other federal
appellate courts, including the Fifth Circuit, which includes Texas. 5
EP: And how does the language in paragraph 5 aid the lender?
50. This assumes that the guarantor has not executed a partial guaranty. Consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical. Borrower executes a promissory note for $1,000,000. The borrower's parent
corporation guarantees repayment of only $700,000. When the borrower files its bankruptcy peti-
tion, the unpaid principal is $800,000 (with the $200,000 paid more than ninety days before but
within one year of the filing date of the petition). If the bankruptcy trustee attempts to recover the
$200,000 from the lender, may the lender successfully argue that the parent guarantor never re-
ceived a benefit from the $200,000 payment (because its exposure under the guaranty did not'
decrease) and thus the preference period is only 90 days (precluding disgorgement of the $200,000
received outside the 90-day period)? See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cambridge Meridian Group, Inc.
(In re Erin Food Servs., Inc.), 980 F.2d 792, 800-01 (lst Cir. 1992); Cannon Ball Indus., Inc. v.
Sequa Corp. (In re Cannon Ball Indus., Inc.), 155 B.R. 177, 179-80 (N.D. I11. 1993).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B)(iii). Each subsidiary corporation of the borrower that executes a
guaranty is also an insider if the borrower directly or indirectly owns at least 20% of the outstand-
ing capital stock of the subsidiary guarantor. Id. § 101(31)(E) (stating insiders includes affiliates)
and § 101(2) (1988) (defining "affiliate").
52. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988). "The one-year preference period is designed to inhibit
insiders-entities normally privy to inside financial information long before it becomes available
to arm's-length creditors-from influencing the insolvent debtor to deplete its remaining assets
for the insider's benefit, to the detriment of non-insider creditors." In re Erin Food Servs., Inc.,
980 F.2d at 796.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988). The trustee may also recover the value of the payments
from the guarantor as an "entity for whose benefit such transfer was made . Id. But as
between the lender and the guarantor, guess whose pockets appear deeper to the trustee.
54. See, e.g., Banner v. S. S. Pierce Co. (In re Pine Springs Farm & Casino, Inc.), 139 B.R.
90, 92-93 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing numerous articles).
55. See Southmark Corp. v. Southmark Personal Storage, Inc. (In re Southmark Corp.), 993
F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Sufolla, Inc. v. U. S.
Nat'l Bank (In re Sufolla, Inc.), 2 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Erin Food Servs., Inc., 980 F.2d
at 792; Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re CL Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990);
Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 892 F.2d
850 (10th Cir. 1989).
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HC: The waiver attempts to eliminate the risk to the lender that it
will be required to disgorge to the trustee all loan payments made by the
borrower more than ninety days before, but within one year of, the filing
date of the bankruptcy petition. The theory is that if the guarantor waives
all of its rights of recourse, subrogation, etc., it is not a creditor because it
no longer has a claim. And if the guarantor is not a creditor, loan payments
made more than ninety days before the filing date of the bankruptcy petition
do not benefit an insider creditor. Absent any benefit to an insider, the
preference period is limited to ninety days. Therefore, payments made by
the borrower to the lender outside the 90-day preference period are not re-
coverable from the lender by the trustee. 6
EP: Sounds plausible. Has any court ruled on the enforceability of
this waiver?
HC: Yes. To my knowledge, the only two courts that have addressed
the enforceability of such a provision have ruled in favor of the lender and
against the trustee.57
EP: Any thoughts from the guarantor's perspective, Miranda?
MD: Generally, there's not a lot of room for negotiating the provi-
sion. 8 However, because the lender is concerned about extending the pref-
erence period from ninety days to one year-and such an extension only
exists if the guarantor is an insidetr 9-then, as guarantor's counsel, I insist
on language that makes the waiver applicable only if the guarantor is an
"insider" as defined by the Bankruptcy Code. Howard will agree with me
that the lender and its counsel should be amenable to the change.
HC: You're right, Miranda. Usually, when the guaranty is executed,
the parties know whether the guarantor falls within the Bankruptcy Code's
56. In addition to relying on any waiver language in the guaranty, a lender may be able to
rebut. the bankruptcy trustee's preference attack with other arguments. See Levit v. Ingersoll Rand
Fin. Corp. (In re V. M. Deprizio Constr.), 874 F.2d 1186, 1198-1200 (7th Cir. 1989).
57. See Hostmann v. First Interstate Bank, N.A. (In re XTI Xonix Tech. Inc.), 156 B.R. 821,
826 (Bankr. D. Or. 1993); Hendon v. Associates Comm. Corp. (In re Fastrans, Inc.), 142 B.R.
241, 245 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992); see also In re Sufolla, Inc., 2 F.3d at 983 ("It reasons that in
order to maneuver around Deprizio, and as a condition to the extension of credit, lenders will
compel guarantors to waive their rights of reimbursement or indemnification from the debtor.
Deprizio arguably is inapplicable in such circumstances because the insider is no longer a 'credi-
tor.' ") (footnote omitted). But see id. at 986 ("Whether a waiver of the guarantor's rights against
the debtor suffices to circumvent this rule is a question we leave for another panel and another
day."). Cf. Covey v. Northwest Community Bank (In re Helen Gallagher Enters., Inc.), 126 B.R.
997 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1991) (suggesting in dicta that waiver might be unenforceable).
58. But for an article that discourages the use of such waiver language, see Peter L.
Borowitz, Waiving Subrogation Rights and Conjuring Up Demons in Response to Deprizio, 45
Bus. LAW. 2151 (1990) (arguing that waiver language may create fraudulent transfer risk for the
lender).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
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detailed definition of "insider." It's possible, however, that during the life
of the guaranty, the relationship between the guarantor and the borrower
might change, resulting in an insider becoming a noninsider, or vice
versa.6" Also, any time you deal with a statute you become subject to the
vagaries of judicial interpretation.
EP: Miranda, could the contractual relationship between a lender and
a borrower render the lender an insider?
MD: I doubt it, unless the lender has the ability to exercise actual
managerial control over the borrower or enjoys some special affinity with
the borrower that extends beyond a business relationship, whether long-
term or otherwise. In my opinion, such control should not be present
merely because the lender can exert financial leverage or exercise its rights
under the loan documents. However, a court probably would find sufficient
control if the lender could unqualifiably dictate corporate policy and the
disposition of corporate assets.61
EP: Now let's turn to the provisions concerning representations, war-
ranties, and covenants of ABC. Miranda, your comments, please.
6. Representations and Warranties. Guarantor acknowledges
that certain representations and warranties in the Credit Agreement
are applicable to it and confirms that each such representation and
warranty is true and correct. [Guarantor also represents and warrants
to Lender as follows:]
7. Covenants. Guarantor acknowledges that certain covenants
and other provisions in the Credit Agreement are applicable to it or
will be imposed upon it and agrees to promptly and properly comply
with or be bound by each of them. [In addition, Guarantor further
covenants and agrees with Lender as follows:]
MD: Many of the representations, warranties, and covenants in the
credit agreement between BigBank and XYZ are applicable to "the Compa-
nies," or some similar term that is defined to include XYZ, as borrower, and
any of its affiliated companies-including, without limitation, any affiliate
that executes a loan paper, such as a guaranty or a collateral document.
Whether I represent the lender or the guarantor, my primary task in drafting
and negotiating representations, warranties, and covenants in any ancillary
60. For example, an individual guarantor who is a director or officer of a corporate borrower
is an insider, as is a corporate parent that owns 100% of the capital stock of the borrower. 11
U.S.C. § 101(31)(B)(i)-(iii) (Supp. IV 1992). However, during the life of the guaranty the indi-
vidual guarantor might lose his directorship or office, and the corporate parent might sell such a
large percentage of the capital stock of the borrower that it no longer controls the debtor. Many
times, these and other changes in insider status may trigger a default under the loan papers. For
example, the loan papers may include a provision that prohibits a parent guarantor from owning
less than a specific percentage of the outstanding capital stock of its subsidiary borrower.
61. See Lynn v. Continental Bank, N.A. (In re Murchison), 154 B.R. 909, 913 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1993).
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document, such as the guaranty, is to ensure consistency with provisions in
the credit agreement. My preference is to include in the guaranty only
those representations, warranties, and covenants that address matters not
specifically covered by the credit agreement.62 If the subject matter is al-
ready addressed by a provision in the credit agreement and is applicable to
the guarantor,63 then I prefer to rely on incorporation by reference and the
guarantor's acknowledgement thereof, rather than restate all of the provi-
sions verbatim in the guaranty-which can easily double the length of the
guaranty.
EP: Howard, tell us about the next paragraph.
8. Actions Not Releases. Guarantor's obligations under this
Guaranty will not be released, diminished, or affected by the occur-
rence of any one or more of the following events: (a) Lender's taking
or acceptance of any other security or guaranty for any or all of the
Guaranteed Debt; (b) any release, surrender, exchange, subordina-
tion, impairment, or loss of any collateral securing any or all of the
Guaranteed Debt; (c) any full or partial release of the liability of any
other obligor on the Guaranteed Debt; (d) the modification of, or
waiver of compliance with, any terms of any other Loan Paper; (e)
the insolvency, bankruptcy, or lack of corporate or partnership power
of any party at any time liable for any or all of the Guaranteed Debt,
whether now existing or hereafter occurring; (f) any renewal, exten-
sion, or rearrangement of any or all of the Guaranteed Debt or any
adjustment, indulgence, forbearance, or compromise that may be
granted or given by Lender to any other obligor on the Guaranteed
Debt; (g) any neglect, delay, omission, failure, or refusal of Lender to
take or prosecute any action in connection with the Guaranteed Debt;
(h) any failure of Lender to notify Guarantor of the creation or incur-
rence of any Guaranteed Debt, any renewal, extension, or assignment
of any or all of the Guaranteed Debt, the release of any security, any
new agreement between Lender and Borrower, or any other action
taken or refrained from being taken by Lender against Borrower, it
being understood that Lender is not required to give Guarantor any
notice of any kind under any circumstances whatsoever with respect
to or in connection with the Guaranteed Debt, other than any notice
required to be given to Guarantor elsewhere in this Guaranty; (i) the
unenforceability of any part of the Guaranteed Debt against any party
because it exceeds the amount permitted by law, the act of creating it
62. Examples might include a guarantor's covenant to maintain certain financial covenants
or deliver certain financial statements different from, and in addition to, the financial covenants to
be maintained or financial statements to be delivered by the borrower.
63. Examples of provisions in a credit agreement that are applicable to a guarantor often
include representations, warranties, and covenants concerning the guarantor's (i) existence, good
standing, and authority to transact business as a foreign corporation, (ii) debt and liens, (iii) litiga-
tion matters, (iv) corporate authorization to execute and deliver the guaranty, and (v) compliance
with laws, including environmental laws and ERISA (an acronym for "Elvis Really Is Still
Alive").
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is ultra vires, the officers creating it exceeded their authority or vio-
lated their fiduciary duties in connection therewith, or otherwise; or
0) any payment of the Obligation to Lender is held to constitute a
preference under any Debtor Relief Law or for any other reason
Lender is required to refund such payment or make payment to some-
one else (and in each such instance this Guaranty will be reinstated in
an amount equal to such payment).64
HC: Some variation of this paragraph is included in almost every
guaranty for the purpose of preventing the guarantor from asserting de-
fenses to liability if certain events occur, such as those listed. Under Texas
law, a guaranty is strictly construed, and any ambiguity or uncertainty is
resolved in favor of the guarantor and against the lender.65 To prevent any
ambiguity and uncertainty, this provision expressly states that the guarantor
is not released from liability if any of the specified events occur. Numerous
cases illustrate that a guarantor's continued liability following certain acts
by the lender or the borrower often hinges on the presence or absence of
express language in the guaranty.66
EP: Miranda, any thoughts on this paragraph?
64. If the guaranty provides for a cure period under paragraph 4, lender's counsel should add
some form of the following to the end of this paragraph:
or (k) the exercise by Lender of any rights or remedies under the Credit Agreement in
violation of Paragraph 4 of this Guaranty.
65. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Vahlco Corp., 800 F.2d 462, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1986) (ruling
that guarantor could attempt to avoid liability on grounds that lender extended maturity and im-
paired collateral, unless guaranty contained waiver of those defenses); United States v. Little Joe
Trawlers, Inc., 776 F.2d 1249, 1254 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding that even if Texas law required
creditor to give guarantor notice to accelerate debt, creditor's failure to give such notice did not
release guarantor from liability where guaranty expressly provided that guarantor's obligations
would remain alive even if guarantor might be released from performance by operation of law);
Vastine v. Bank of Dallas, 808 S.W.2d 463, 464-65 (Tex. 1991) (holding that guarantor could
assert defense of material alteration of underlying contract in absence of language in guaranty
permitting creditor and principal debtor to change contract without guarantor's consent); Cham-
bers v. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, 841 S.W.2d 132, 134-35 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1992, no writ) (holding that guarantor remained liable for debt incurred by partnership after incor-
poration because guaranty stated that change in status of debtor by "merger, consolidation or
otherwise" would not alter guarantor's liability); Simpson v. MBank Dallas, N.A., 724 S.W.2d
102, 106 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that guarantor could not avoid
liability on theory that lender had impaired collateral without his consent because guaranty ex-
pressly permitted lender, at its discretion, to surrender, release, exchange, or alter any collateral
without affecting guarantor's liability); Hernandez v. Bexar County Nat'l Bank, 710 S.W.2d 684,
688-89 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (ruling that guarantor was not dis-
charged from liability under guaranty on theory that he did not consent to renewal of notes where
guaranty expressly permitted lender to create, renew, extend, or alter the guaranteed debt without
notice to guarantor); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Northeast Texas Dev. Co., 635 S.W.2d 897, 899
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that release of deed of trust did not discharge
guarantors from liability where guaranty stated that liability would not be affected, modified, or
diminished by release of collateral); Brazosport Bank v. Travis, 617 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that guarantor's liability survived
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MD: Not, as guarantor's counsel. But I do have two comments from
the perspective of lender's counsel. First, a guarantor falls within the Uni-
form Commercial Code Article 9 definition of "debtor,"67 and thus gener-
ally cannot waive its right to notice of sale or disposition of collateral under
section 9.504(c) prior to default on the guaranteed debt68-regardless of
any contrary waiver provisions in the guaranty, including clause (h) above.
Therefore, unless a guarantor waives after default its right to receive notice
of any sale or other disposition of collateral, a lender's failure to give such
notice to the guarantor will prevent the lender from recovering any defi-
ciency judgment against the guarantor.69 Second, a lender should never
rely on waiver language in a guaranty or any other loan document as an
excuse for ignoring pleading and proof requirements. For example, the
Texas Supreme Court has held that a lender's failure to raise as an affirma-
tive defense a guarantor's express waiver of the defense of collateral im-
pairment reduced the guarantor's liability by the extent of the collateral
impairment.7"
EP: While we're on the subject of waivers, I'll ask Miranda to com-
ment on paragraph 9.
9. Waiver of Procedural Rights. Guarantor waives all of its
rights by which it might be entitled to require suit on an accrued right
of action on any of the Guaranteed Debt or against Borrower or
others, whether arising under section 34.02 of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code, as amended, section 17.001 of the Texas Civil
execution of renewal and extension note without its consent where guaranty incorporated terms of
note, which expressly stated guarantor's liability would not be affected by extension or renewal).
67. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.105(4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) ("'Debtor'
means the person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation secured, whether or
not he owns or has rights in the collateral .... ) (emphasis added); FDIC v. Payne, 973 F.2d 403,
409 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Texas courts have consistently held that the term 'debtor' in Section 9.504
includes guarantors of secured transactions..'.."); Adams v. Waldrop, 740 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1987, no writ) ("The requirements of Section 9.504 which apply to a debtor also
apply to a guarantor of a secured transaction."); Hernandez, 710 S.W.2d at 687.
68. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) ("Unless collateral
is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recog-
nized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notifi-
cation of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be
sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or
modifying his right to notification of sale.") (emphasis added). See id. § 9.501(c) ("To the extent
that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties on the secured party, the rules stated in the
subsections referred to below may not be waived or varied ... (2) Subsection (c) of Section 9.504
.... ").
69. See Payne, 973 F.2d at 403 (barring lender from seeking deficiency judgment from guar-
antor after lender erroneously relied on waiver language in guaranty as excuse for failing to give
notice of collateral sale to guarantor); Hernandez, 710 S.W.2d at 686-87.
70. See T. 0. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 223-24 (Tex. 1992);
see also Greathouse v. Charter Nat'l Bank, 851 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1992) (discussing pleading and
proof responsibilities concerning commercial reasonableness of collateral dispositions).
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Practice and Remedies Code, as amended, Rule 31 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, or otherwise.
MD: Section 34.02 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code dis-
charges a guarantor's liability if the guarantor requests the lender to sue on
the guaranty and the lender fails to do so within a specified period of time
or fails to prosecute the suit to judgment and thereafter execute on the judg-
ment.7 ' Section 17.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
permits a lender to sue a guarantor without suing the borrower, but it pre-
cludes entry of judgment against the guarantor prior to entry of judgment
against the borrower.72 Rule 31 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quires the lender to join the borrower in any suit against the guarantor un-
less judgment has been previously entered against the borrower.73 Because
the referenced statutes and rule give ABC some rights that limit BigBank's
ability to recover the guaranteed debt from ABC, paragraph 9 requires ABC
to waive those rights.
EP: Will a Texas court enforce a guarantor's waiver of its rights
under these statutes and rule?
MD:. Yes, because the rights being waived are intended solely for the
benefit of the guarantor and do not confer benefits on any third party.74
EP: Howard, what about paragraph 10?
10. Subordination. All obligations of Borrower to Guarantor
(the "Subordinated Debt") are expressly subordinated to the full and
final payment of the Guaranteed Debt. Guarantor agrees not to ac-
cept any payment of the Subordinated Debt from Borrower if a De-
fault exists. Guarantor will hold in trust for Lender and promptly
turn over to Lender (with any necessary endorsements) for applica-
tion against the Guaranteed Debt any payment of the Subordinated
Debt that Guarantor receives in violation of this paragraph.
HC: A default suggests that XYZ may be having financial difficulty
and will not be able to timely pay all of its creditors, including BigBank.
ABC may also be a creditor of XYZ, either as a result of making permitted
intercorporate loans to XYZ, providing centralized management services to
XYZ, or otherwise. BigBank wants to be protected against the possibility
71. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 34.02(a), (b) (Vernon 1987).
72. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.001(a), (b) (Vernon 1986).
73. TEX. R. Civ. P. 31.
74. See Yandell v. Tarrant State Bank, 538 S.W.2d 684, 687-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (examining waiver of rights under TEX. R. Civ. P. 31 and precursor
to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.001); see also Hanks v. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, 815
S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991, no writ) (addressing waiver of rights under TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE § 34.02); Ford v. Darwin, 767 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989,
writ denied) (examining waiver of rights under TEX. R. Civ. P. 31 and TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 17.001(b)); Hernandez v. Bexar County Nat'l Bank, 710 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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that XYZ may favor ABC over BigBank if XYZ is in a cash-poor position.
This paragraph gives BigBank protection against that likelihood by requir-
ing ABC not only to subordinate its debt to BigBank's debt, but also to
surrender to BigBank any and all debt payments made by XYZ to ABC
while a default exists.
MD: It's possible that BigBank may require XYZ's subsidiaries and
non-affiliated third parties to execute a detailed subordination agreement. If
ABC is also a party to that agreement, then ABC's counsel should request
BigBank's counsel to delete the subordination paragraph from the guaranty
and instead rely on the separate subordination agreement.
EP: What about this next paragraph, Miranda?
11. Guarantor's Due Diligence. Guarantor confirms that it
has executed and delivered this Guaranty after reviewing the terms
and conditions of the Loan Papers and all other information that it has
deemed appropriate in order to make its own credit analysis and deci-
sion to execute and deliver this Guaranty. Guarantor confirms that it
has independently investigated Borrower's creditworthiness and is
not executing and delivering this Guaranty in reliance on any repre-
sentation or warranty by Lender as to such creditworthiness. Guaran-
tor expressly assumes all responsibilities to remain informed of
Borrower's financial condition and any circumstances affecting (a)
Borrower's ability to perform its obligations under the Loan Papers to
which it is a party or (b) any collateral securing all or any part of the
Guaranteed Debt.
MD: BigBank will enter into a credit relationship with XYZ only
after conducting the necessary due diligence and satisfying itself that XYZ
is a creditworthy customer. BigBank does not intend for any third party-
including ABC-to be the beneficiary of its due diligence. Nor does
BigBank want to suggest to any third-party obligor-including ABC-that
BigBank alone has the sole responsibility to monitor the credit and the at-
tendant risks until the loan is fully paid. This paragraph requires ABC to
attest that it has conducted its own due diligence, is familiar with the terms
of the credit documents, and will assume responsibility for keeping itself
informed of XYZ's financial condition during the life of the loan. Further-
more, absent egregious conduct by BigBank, ABC's confirmation that it is
not relying on anything that BigBank has said or done should estop ABC
from successfully arguing that the guaranty is unenforceable on any theory
that BigBank fraudulently induced ABC to execute the guaranty.75
75. See Motorola, Inc. v. Chapman, 761 F. Supp. 458, 462-63 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (holding
that to prove fraud in inducement sufficient to allow exception to parol evidence rule, guarantor
must prove trickery, artifice, or device in addition to misrepresentation); Town North Nat'l Bank
v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1978) (reviewing Texas caselaw addressing whether parol
evidence rule prohibits admission of extrinsic evidence to prove maker was induced by payee's
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EP: And your thoughts, Howard, on paragraph 12.
12. No Defenses; Reinstatement. The Guaranteed Debt will
not be reduced, discharged, or released by any existing or future off-
set, claim, or defense (except for the defense of complete, final, and
irrevocable payment of the Guaranteed Debt) of Borrower or any
other party against Lender or against payment of the Guaranteed
Debt, whether such offset, claim, or defense arises in connection with
the Guaranteed Debt or otherwise. Guarantor agrees that if any pay-
ment of the Guaranteed Debt is held to constitute a preference under
any Debtor Relief Law or for any other reason Lender is required to
refund any such payment or make payment to someone else, this
Guaranty will continue to remain effective and Guarantor's obliga-
tions under this Guaranty will be reinstated in an amount equal to
such payment.
HC: When BigBank demands payment from ABC following a de-
fault, the only acceptable defense for non-payment is that BigBank has re-
ceived full and final payment of the guaranteed debt and has not been
required to disgorge any payment received. ABC cannot avoid payment
liability by raising personal defenses of XYZ, such as failure of considera-
tion, breach of warranty, statute of limitations, usury, mistake, impossibil-
ity, and unconscionability.76
EP: You specifically mention the defenses of usury and statute of
limitations. I thought that a guarantor of a usurious obligation was dis-
charged from liability because the usurious obligation was void. And I
would have guessed that a guarantor could avoid liability if the statute of
limitations barred collection from the borrower.
HC: Texas cases suggest otherwise, holding that (1) a valid usury
claim does not render the underlying obligation void,77 (2) a guarantor can-
not avoid liability on a usurious obligation unless the guaranty itself pro-
vides for usurious interest,7" and (3) a lender may maintain an action
misrepresentation to execute promissory note); Simpson v. MBank Dallas, N.A., 724 S.W.2d 102,
108 (Tex. App.-Dallas, 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Rosas v. United States Small Bus.
Admin., 964 F.2d 351, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Town North Nat'l Bank and Simpson).
76. See Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Windham, 668 F. Supp. 578,
584-85 (E.D. Tex. 1987) (citing various cases and defenses).
77. See FSLIC v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 701 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1163
(1992) ("When the Texas Supreme Court has used the term 'void' in connection with usury, they
seem to imply only that the usurious interest is void. The Texas courts have not held that underly-
ing obligation itself is void for illegality."); Houston Sash and Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d
217, 222 (Tex. 1979) ("The [usury statute], furthermore, does not declare the underlying open
account transaction void, but merely provides Bedford a defensive setoff. It is only where the
underlying obligation is void for illegality that a guaranty must fall with it.") (citations omitted).
78. See Houston Sash and Door Co., 577 S.W.2d at 221-22 (reducing guarantor's liability
by appropriate usury penalty triggered by language in guaranty); Moore v. White Motor Credit
Corp., 708 S.W.2d 465, 472 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("The guarantor of a note
usurious as to the borrower, but whose individual contract with the lender does not provide for
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against a guarantor even if the statute of limitations bars the lender's claim
against the borrower.79
EP: Well, I learned something new today. It looks as if we have two
paragraphs left to discuss. Since both of them are relatively short, let's
examine them together. Miranda, your thoughts, please.
13. Successors and Assigns. This Guaranty benefits Lender
and its successors and permitted assigns and binds Guarantor and its
successors and permitted assigns. Guarantor acknowledges that the
rights and benefits of this Guaranty may be transferred with any per-
mitted assignment of the Guaranteed Debt.
14. Miscellaneous. This Guaranty is a Loan Paper and is sub-
ject to the applicable provisions of Section ["miscellaneous"] of the
Credit Agreement, all of which are incorporated into this Guaranty by
reference the same as if restated verbatim in this Guaranty.
MD: Paragraph 13 merely indicates that the benefits and burdens of
the guaranty flow to BigBank's and ABC's respective successors and per-
mitted assigns, including-in the case of BigBank-any assignee of the
guaranteed debt. The word "permitted" is inserted because the credit agree-
ment often limits BigBank's and ABC's ability to assign its respective in-
terest in the loan papers to a third party.8° The purpose of paragraph 14 is
to save the drafting party the trouble of retyping provisions found in the
credit agreement that address such matters as amendments and waivers,
governing law, waiver of jury trial, jurisdiction submission, venue, counter-
parts, usury savings, number and gender of words, communications, oral
agreements, etc. ABC should be bound by such provisions, even if not
restated in the guaranty, because in paragraph I I ABC'confirms that it has
reviewed the terms of the loan papers, and in paragraph 7, ABC acknowl-
edges that certain provisions in the credit agreement are applicable to it, or
will be imposed upon it, and agrees to promptly and properly comply with
or be bound by each of them."' If the drafting party elects to include in the
guaranty some or all of the applicable miscellaneous provisions in the credit
usurious interest, cannot avoid his liability on the ground that usurious interest was paid by the
principal debtor; he may, however, plead usury in his contract."), overruled on other grounds by
Carpet Servs., Inc. v. George A. Fuller Co., 802 S.W.2d 343, 345-46 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991),
aff'd, 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1992).
79. See Beddall v. Reader's Wholesale Distribs., Inc., 408 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1966, no writ) ("While there is some authority to the contrary, the great weight of
authority is that an action to recover on a contract of guaranty cannot be defended by showing that
the claim against the original debtor has been barred by the statute of limitations.").
80. The credit agreement usually prohibits the guarantor from assigning or transferring any
of its rights, duties, and obligations under the guaranty. The credit agreement may place some
limits on a lender's ability to assign or transfer all or part of its rights, duties, and obligations
under the loan papers. A common limitation requires the lender's assignee or transferee to be a
financial institution.
81. For a case in which the court determined a guarantor's liability by relying on a separate
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agreement out of an abundance of caution, he or she should do so in a
manner that avoids any conflict between the two documents.
HC: Let me make a comment as ABC's counsel. If the proposed
guaranty contains a waiver provision in response to Deprizio similar to par-
agraph 5, ABC's counsel should consider asking the drafting party to add
the following language to paragraph 13:
This Guaranty is for the sole benefit of Lender and its successors and
permitted assigns, and none of the provisions herein (including, with-
out limitation, the provisions of Paragraph 5) shall inure to the benefit
of any other person or entity (including, without limitation, Bor-
rower); consequently, no other person or entity (including, without
limitation, Borrower) shall be entitled to rely upon, or to raise as a
defense, in any manner the provisions herein.
The purpose of asking for the additional language is to somehow pre-
serve the waived rights against XYZ. It may or may not accomplish the
desired purpose, but there's no harm to ABC in asking for the language.
However, BigBank's counsel may argue that the proposed language under-
cuts the enforceability of the waiver, and thus cannot be included. I'm sym-
pathetic to that argument and would concede the point if confronted with
it. 82
EP: We have a few minutes left on today's show, so let's take some
questions from our audience. Yes, sir, you in the back.
MAN IN THE BACK: Does a lender owe any duty of good faith and
fair dealing to a guarantor, particularly since section 1.203 of the Uniform
Commercial Code83 imposes an obligation of good faith into every con-
tract? 84 Or may such a duty be waived by agreement?
MD: First, section 1.102(c) of the UCC prevents a party from waiv-
ing any duty of good faith imposed by section 1.203.85 However, section
1.203 only imposes the duty of good faith on a party to a contract governed
by the UCC. 86 The only chapter of the UCC that might govern the guaranty
document's provisions incorporated by reference into the guaranty, see Brazosport Bank v. Travis,
617 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
82. For two cases with opposing views on whether the trustee in bankruptcy can challenge
the enforceability of a waiver provision similar to paragraph 5, see Hostmann v. First Interstate
Bank, N.A. (In re XTI Xonix Tech. Inc.), 156 B.R. 821 (Bankr. D. Or. 1993) (ruling that trustee
may raise enforceability of waiver); Hendon v. Associates Comm. Corp. (In re Fastrans, Inc.), 142
B.R. 241 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992) (holding that trustee may not raise enforceability of waiver).
83. There is always at least one inquiring mind who enjoys showcasing his or her intelli-
gence by citing specific statutes or cases. And this person just happens to be sitting in the back of
the room-so he can impress everyone.
84. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
85. Id. § 1.102(c) ("The effect of provisions of this title may be varied by agreement...
except that the obligations of good faith ... may not be disclaimed by agreement .... ").
86. Id. § 1.203 ("Every contract.., within this title imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement.") (emphasis added).
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in our transaction is chapter three, entitled "Commercial Paper." I suppose
ABC might argue that it has executed a guaranty and that section 3.416
pertains to contracts of a guarantor,87 the guaranty thus is subject to a provi-
sion of the UCC, and therefore section 1.203 imposes a duty of good faith
on BigBank. This argument has been raised before and usually fails-as it
would here-because the guaranty and the promissory note are separate
documents, which precludes application of section 3.416.88 Unless some
other provision of the UCC applies to the guaranty,8 9 no duty of good faith
is imposed by section 1.203.
EP: But doesn't the common law-separate and apart from the
UCC-impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing on a lender when deal-
ing with a borrower and a guarantor?
MD: I'm afraid not. Absent express contractual language that estab-
87. Id. § 3.416.
88. See FDIC v. Nobles, 901 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[W]e do not believe that the
guaranty is governed by the UCC. The guaranty in this case is separate and apart from the prom-
issory note. A guaranty that is a separate document is not considered a negotiable instrument and
does not fall within the scope of the UCC."); Uniwest Mortgage Co. v. Dadecor Condominiums,
Inc., 877 F.2d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1989) (concluding that the enforceability of a choice-of-law
provision in a guaranty was governed by common law and not UCC); T. 0. Stanley Boot Co. v.
Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. 1992) (holding that guaranties were not negotiable
instruments); FDIC v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706, 710 (Tex. 1990).
Even if the guaranty provisions were added to the bottom of the promissory note and signed
by the guarantor, § 3.416 would apply only if the promissory note itself was a negotiable instru-
ment. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.416 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (making numerous
references throughout to "instrument," which § 3.102(a)(5) defines as a "negotiable instrument").
In many large commercial transactions, the promissory note is no more than one page in length
with only a few paragraphs, one of which is often a variation of the following:
This note incorporates by reference the principal and interest payment terms in the
Credit Agreement for this note. This note also incorporates by reference all other provi-
sions in the Credit Agreement applicable to this note-such as provisions for disburse-
ments of principal, applicable interest rates before and after default, voluntary and
mandatory prepayments, acceleration of maturity, exercise of rights and remedies, pay-
ment of attorneys' fees, court costs, and other costs of collection, certain waivers by
maker and other obligors, assurances and security, choice of Texas and United States
federal law, usury savings, and other matters applicable to "Loan Papers" as defined in
the Credit Agreement.
This paragraph might render the promissory note nonnegotiable. See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 3.104(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) ("Any writing to be a negotiable instrument
within this chapter must ... (2) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay .... "); id.
§ 3.105(a) ("A promise or order otherwise unconditional is not made conditional by the fact that
the instrument ... (3) refers to or states that it arises out of a separate agreement or refers to a
separate agreement for rights as to prepayment or acceleration .... ); id. § 3.105(b) ("A promise
or order is not unconditional if the instrument (I) states that it is subject to or governed by any
other agreement .... ").
89. If the guaranty provisions are part of either a contract for the sale of goods or a security
agreement, then Article 2 (Sales) or Article 9 (Secured Transactions; Sales of Accounts and Chat-
tel Paper) might apply. However, in most transactions-and in the hypothetical transaction in this
article-the guaranty is a stand-alone document.
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lishes the duty of good faith and fair dealing, Texas courts have consistently
refused to impose the duty unless the evidence indicated that a special rela-
tionship of trust and confidence existed between the parties, either as a rec-
ognized fiduciary relationship, or a relationship arising from moral, social,
or personal relationships. However, I'm not aware of any Texas case that
has found such a relationship between a lender and its borrower or
guarantor. 90
EP: Another question? Yes, ma'am.
MA'AM: In many lending transactions, all of the borrower's subsidi-
aries act as guarantors.' If the credit agreement requires the borrower to
cause its future subsidiaries to execute a guaranty, will a failure of consider-
ation problem exist since any such guaranty is not executed contemporane-
ously with the other loan papers?
HC: As we mentioned earlier in the show, a guaranty executed after
related loan papers have been executed may not be enforceable for lack of
new consideration. 91 However, some cases from other jurisdictions have
held that new consideration is not required to support a guaranty executed
subsequent to the principal contract if the guaranty is executed pursuant to a
prior understanding and was an inducement to the execution of the principal
contract.92 A Texas court following this line of cases might enforce a guar-
90. See Coleman, 795 S.W.2d at 708-09 ("The Court has consistently held, however, that a
duty of good faith is not imposed in every contract but only in special relationships marked by
shared trust or an imbalance in bargaining power .... [T]he relationship between a creditor and
[a] guarantor does not ordinarily import a duty of good faith."); SEI Business Sys., Inc. v. Bank
One Texas, N.A., 803 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) ("A secured creditor
owes no duty of good faith to a guarantor."); Nautical Landings Marina, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank,
791 S.W.2d 293, 299 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied) ("We have been cited no
authority and have found none in Texas which imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing on
lenders in general to their borrowers."). But see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement.").
91. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
92. See United States v. Lowell, 557 F.2d 70, 72 (6th Cir. 1977); First Nat'l Bank v. Interna-
tional Mach. Corp., 156 N.W.2d 86, 88 (Minn. 1968); Spittler v. Nicola, 479 N.W.2d 803, 807-08
(Neb. 1992) ("[I]f a guaranty promise was made at a time subsequent to the creation of the
principal obligation, the guaranty promise is still founded upon a consideration if the promise was
given as the result of a previous arrangement, the principal obligation having been induced or
created on the faith of the guaranty."); State Bank v. Porter, 167 N.W.2d 527, 531 (N.D. 1969)
("A guaranty, although executed subsequently to the creation of the principal obligation, if given
in fulfillment of an agreement on the faith of which the principal obligation was created, is
deemed contemporaneous in effect and requires no other consideration."); see also 38 AM. JUR. 2o
Guaranty § 45 (1968) ("Although the guaranty promise may have been made at a time subsequent
to the creation of the principal obligation, the guaranty promise is founded upon a consideration if
the promise was given as the result of previous arrangement, the principal obligation having been
induced by or created on the faith of the guaranty.") (footnote omitted); 38 C.J.S. Guaranty
§ 26(b) (1943) (No new consideration required to support subsequent guaranty "executed pursuant
[Vol. 35:387
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anty executed by a future subsidiary if the guaranty was executed pursuant
to a covenant requirement in the credit agreement, and the covenant induced
the lender to enter into a credit relationship with the borrower. Also,
lender's counsel would be prudent to mention in the recitals to the guaranty
that the guarantor is a new subsidiary of the borrower and is executing the
guaranty as required by the specific covenant in the credit agreement. Per-
haps Miranda has some additional thoughts.
MD: I would argue that the subsequent guaranty is supported by new
consideration. If the borrower fails to cause the new subsidiary to execute a
guaranty, a covenant will be breached and a default will exist, which will
permit the lender to exercise various rights and remedies. However, the
lender will forbear exercising its rights and remedies if the borrower causes
its future subsidiary to execute and deliver a guaranty. In my opinion, the
lender's forbearance constitutes new consideration that supports the subse-
quent guaranty.
EP: Sir, you have a question?
SIR: No, I was just adjusting my toupee.
EP: Oh. Excuse me. Another question for our panelists? Yes, the
gentleman over there.
GENTLEMAN OVER THERE: While we're on the subject of consid-
eration, do either of the panelists have any thoughts on including such
words as "for valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are
acknowledged" or reciting the guarantor's receipt of a nominal amount-
perhaps $10?
MD: I don't have strong feelings on either excluding or including
your suggested language. However, it seems somewhat unnecessary to
mention valuable consideration in a general sense if the guaranty includes
some variation of recital C, which describes specific consideration. Also,
why would a guarantor acknowledge the receipt and adequacy of the con-
sideration when the benefits often flow to another party, the borrower? Fi-
nally, although I have seen numerous documents that referenced nominal
consideration-such as $10-I have no personal knowledge that the money
truly changed hands. I sense that in most, if not all, cases the drafting party
referenced a nominal amount as a formality or pretense, never expecting
actual payment to occur. Query whether a recital of nominal payment gives
a guarantor an escape clause from the guaranty if the lender never pays the
nominal amount.
93
to an understanding had before and is an inducement to the execution of the principal contract" or
"where it is made pursuant to some provision in the principal contract .... ) (footnotes omitted).
93. For a case that gives short shrift to such an argument, see Beltran v. Groos Bank, N.A.,
755 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ) (enforcing payment obligations of a
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EP: Time for one more question. How about the lady in the third
row.
LADY IN THIRD ROW: I understand that Congress is considering
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that would moot the concerns caused
by Deprizio.94 What are your thoughts?
HC: If "pro" is the opposite of "con," then what's the opposite of
"progress"?
MD: And I believe Mark Twain once said, "Suppose you were an
idiot and suppose you were a member of Congress. But I repeat myself."95
EP: On those witty notes we will conclude today's show. Please join
me next week when we'll meet a litigator who legitimately billed a client
for thirty-seven hours of work in a twenty-four-hour period. And in two
weeks, my guest will be a federal appellate judge who writes his own opin-
ions. So long, everybody.
guarantor-the borrower's attorney!-over his objection that he never received the purported
$1.00 of consideration); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 88, cmt. b & illus.
(1981).
94. Kenneth H. Bacon, Senate Passes Bill to Amend Bankruptcy LaW, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22,
1994, at A2 ("The bill [to amend the 1978 Bankruptcy Code] also reverses a court decision that
has discouraged banks from lending to many small businesses. That decision forced lenders to
return all loan payments made in the year before a company filed under the Bankruptcy Code, if
the company's insiders had personally guaranteed the loan."). The proposed bill amends § 550 of
the Bankruptcy Code by preventing a bankruptcy trustee from recovering loan payments from a
lender that are guaranteed by an insider unless the lender also is an insider. See 139 CONo. REC.
S2,619 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1993). As of the publication date of this article, the House of Repre-
sentatives had not yet passed a companion bill.
95. BYRNE, supra note 9, at 111.
HeinOnline  -- 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 416 1994
